THE STORY OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME IN NIGERIA FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ORGANIZED LABOUR by NWAGBARA, EUCHARIA NWABUGO
Australian Journal of Business and Management Research   Vol.1 No.7 [30-41] | October-2011                                     
 
30 
THE STORY OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME IN NIGERIA 
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ORGANIZED LABOUR 
NWAGBARA, EUCHARIA NWABUGO, Ph. D 
Department of Sociology 
University of Calabar 
E-mail: eucharia_n@yahoo.com 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
The process of achieving the set objectives of structural adjustment programme (SAP) produced adverse social 
effects that put to question the sincerity of purpose of the SAP policy designers and implementers. To be able to 
generate conclusions concerning how the politics of enhancing the “well-being” of the people via SAP played 
out in the Nigerian society, in terms of how well the programme served the intended purpose, questions have to 
be asked, and responses elicited. Earlier attempts at appraising the SAP were geared toward examining the 
successes  or  failures  of  the  adjusting  countries  in  implementing  the  policies.  Such  appraisal  gave  rise  to 
concern on the issue of good governance as a necessary and inevitable prerequisite of effective economic 
reform. At the same time, not much effort was made at ascertaining the social fallouts of the entire reform 
process. Even when the outburst of public outcry within the adjusting countries necessitated the recognition of 
the importance of the social dimension of SAP, little effort was made at understanding the problem from the 
perspective of the aggrieved populace. What we see is a proliferation of World Bank sponsored studies on the 
issue that hardly take cognizance of the people‟s feelings. Thus the findings of such studies cannot be said to be 
representative of the views of all the stakeholders. This paper attempts to fill this gap by examining organized 
labour‟s/interest groups‟ response to SAP from the lens of the public sector workers and why they reacted the 
way they did toward the entire process. A sample of 357 respondents was randomly selected from university 
teachers, students and other public servants within Calabar metropolis. The findings, which were described in 
simple  percentages,  show  significant  relationship  between  economic  hardship,  repressive  attitude  of 
government,  political  uncertainty  and  interest  groups‟  protests  against  SAP.  The  author  recommends  the 
provision of adequate safety nets whenever stringent policies are to be introduced so as to cushion the adverse 
effect on the people; utilization of the collective bargaining tool by the parties in industrial relations as well as 
the implementation of SAP with „a human face‟, among others.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past couple of decades, there has been a steady increase in the scholarly literature on organized labour 
and industrial relations systems in developing countries the bulk of which is on trade union militancy, strikes, 
and  union  organization  and  membership  (Seidman,  1994;  Scoville,  1988;  Fashoyin,  1992;  Cooper,  1996). 
Recently, however, a number of studies have appeared in the literature increasingly focusing on comparative 
studies of the phenomenon of industrial relations systems among developing countries (Verma, Kochan, and 
Lansbury, 1995). This was not the case prior to this time and even the recent development has not been massive 
when compared to the enormous amount of literature generated in the field among the developed industrial 
nations of the West.  
 
The recent upsurge of interest in this area on developing countries in the last couple of decades among scholars 
could be accounted for by the much debated globalization issue especially the global economic crisis that has 
left most developing countries with huge debt burden. Of particular importance is the economic deterioration of 
the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s  that  compelled  most  developing  countries  to  adopt  one  form  of  economic 
transformation and adjustment programme or the other with the help of the World Bank/ International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  This study is informed by the need to understand the effect of the adjustment policies on public 
sector industrial relations in Nigeria through the spectrum of organized labour and other interest groups.  
 
By the late 1970s and the turn of the 1980s, African countries like their counterparts in other developing parts of 
the world were confronted with massive economic decline and overbearing debt burden which were accentuated 
by the global economic down-turn (Nwagbara, 2004).  Consequently, the absence of necessary finances brought 
to  a  halt  the  implementation  of  vital  national  programmes  of  economic  development  and  political 
modernization. This warranted the option of seeking the aid of the international financiers, which was not easily 
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arrears of debt. As a result, subsequent granting of financial assistance was tied with stringent conditionality of 
some form of structural adjustment in the internal structure of the economy of the borrowing countries. Thus, 
one of the obvious outcomes of developing nations‟ response to economic crisis is the mandatory adoption of 
structural policies manifesting either in the form of stabilization or structural adjustment, or both.  
 
The introduction of SAP, and the subsequent implementation of the IMF/World Bank conditionality attached to 
it, came with some negative consequences that affected many sectors of the economy such as agriculture and 
industry. In fact, SAP came at a time when Nigeria was beset by a charged political atmosphere fueled by the 
biting economic hardship that hit most families. Cognizant of the situation, the government in power still went 
ahead to implement the IMF conditionality that led to many unpleasant consequences such as workers losing 
their jobs through retrenchment, many people not being able to afford most of the necessities of life due to wage 
cuts and withdrawal of subsidies, skyrocketing inflationary situation occasioned by currency devaluation, high 
rates of unemployment, etc.  
 
It is the people at the centre of it that can attest to the effectiveness or otherwise of SAP in improving their 
living standard. In other words, they are the ones who can say how their lives as individuals or groups have been 
positively or negatively affected by SAP. How did they – individuals and groups view the phenomenon of SAP 
and its consequences on their lives? 
 
Eliciting responses from people on the above issue will no doubt touch on certain perceptive economic, social, 
and political problems that need to be tackled as a matter of necessity. While many a Nigerian – rural and urban 
– have been affected by SAP, it was the urban dwellers, especially organized labour and other interest groups 
that felt its pangs the more and so opposed its introduction accordingly. This assertion corroborates the view of 
Herbst (1993:61) as he observes, “…urban workers are one of the chief targets of economic reform programmes 
that hope to bring about fundamental changes in African economies”. Indeed, three of the five conditionality of 
the World Bank/IMF were directed against this category of the population. 
 
Organized labour generally reacted against SAP and all it stood for by using its grievance weapons and other 
available  subtle  strategies.  These  included  but  not  limited  to  demonstrating  along  the  streets,  public 
enlightenment rallies, distribution of handbills, inciting and receiving the sympathy of the general public, strike 
actions, etc. How did the Babangida administration deal with the situation? In other words,  what  were the 
factors that influenced the attitude of organized labour and how government handled the opposition.  
 
An attempt to answer the „why‟ aspect of the question brings us headlong with the industrial relations situation 
in Nigeria under the military administration of Gen. Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida during the SAP period. By so 
doing, the study will lead to a deeper understanding of the Nigerian industrial relations practice in the public 
sector in comparative perspective with previous regimes in Nigeria as units of comparison. An examination of 
various regimes in Nigeria in comparative perspective will, no doubt, reveal the divergences and similarities in 
industrial relations practice between the different regimes.  
 
There are divergent views as to the nature of the impact of the SAP on the economy of African countries. Some 
of the views, especially those sponsored by the World Bank, are pro-SAP and blame failures on government 
„softness‟ and other factors outside the adjustment policy itself. World Bank research studies present SAP as 
beneficial with varying degree of successes and failures among adjusting nations, while other studies tend to 
condemn it as anti-development and a failure. Several reasons such as corrupt and inept political leadership; 
turbulent  and  unstable  political  environment;  lack  of  credibility  on  the  part  of  leadership  and  incessant 
opposition  from  interest  groups,  etc,  have  been  adduced  for  its  inability  to  achieve  the  desired  result  of 
economic transformation and set the developing economies on a sound path of development (Beckman, 1992). 
While this study does not concern itself with the debate on whether or not SAP is success, it will attempt to 
ascertain the impact of SAP on an aspect of the economy – the public sector employment. 
 
 In Nigeria, the most prominent and vocal opposition against SAP came from the public sector employees ably 
represented by the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC). 
Some of the stringent conditionality of the IMF has direct adverse consequences on this category of workers in 
the country. With its articulate and vantage position in the society, organized labour was able to mount public 
enlightenment  campaigns  against  the  adoption  of  the  SAP  by  educating  the  general  public  on  the  adverse 
implications of such measures on their well-being and those of the next generation yet unborn. But this attitude 
had the potency of stalling the implementation of the adjustment policies.  
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Babangida‟s administration launched series of enlightenment campaigns and applied repressive measures to 
counter the devastating effects of the activities of organized labour on the stability of the regime. The sponsors 
of the SAP believe that a more authoritarian regime was a prerequisite for successful implementation of SAP 
(Bangura and Beckman, 1993). It was within this kind of scenario that industrial relation was practiced in the 
public sector during this period. By carrying out this research, the researcher intends to capture a somewhat 
first-hand account of what transpired during the era from the active participants in the scene. 
 
One of the foremost assumptions in this study is that the extent of organized labour reaction to the introduction 
of SAP is a function of the extent of its power in relation to government‟s power in the country‟s industrial 
relations system. In other words, there is a relationship between the extent of organized labour opposition to 
SAP and the amount of power it wields in industrial relations in Nigeria. This seemingly one to one relationship 
derives from the fact of organized labour being government employees and both are actors within the industrial 
relations scene. The relative power of each of the actors derives from the society and influences their respective 
ability to influence the rules of the game (Dunlop, 1993). Government in its dual capacity as the umpire and 
employer of labour in Nigeria tends to utilize its superior power to its advantage against organized labour. A 
typical example of the interplay of power between government and organized labour in industrial relations is 
manifested in the events during SAP. Thus, an attempt to answer the question of how and why organized labour 
in Nigeria reacted the way it did to government‟s introduction of SAP will lead to another related issue, that of 
government‟s repressive strategy and intention.  
 
President Babangida‟s authoritarian style of leadership exhibits characteristic  features  of statist corporatism 
(Cawson, 1986) similar in many ways to other known cases in recent history. In none of the known cases was 
the resistance of organized labour so severe as to stall the political stability of the leadership right from the onset 
as in Nigerian instance under Babangida‟s regime.  Apart from the adverse consequences of SAP, Babangida‟s 
transition to civil rule programme dragged on endlessly beyond the stipulated deadline for no apparent cause 
that his “good” intention became suspect and robbed his administration of the little credibility it earlier had.  
 
The  combined  effect  of  these  discrepancies  was  increased  discontentment  and  opposition  from  organized 
interest  groups  and  the  members  of  the  general  public.  Babangida‟s  strategic  response  to  interest  group 
opposition in ways that were sometimes, subtle inclusion and exclusion of opposition and some other times, 
overt repression and incarceration earned him nicknames such as a master schemer and Nigerian „maradona‟. 
What  was the Nigerian industrial relations system like under the Babangida‟s administration? How does it 
compare with industrial relations in other regimes that preceded it in the country?  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the 1980s, the structural adjustment programme, SAP, a phenomenon associated with developed nations as 
observed by Toye (1995) was transferred to governments of the developing countries as an avenue to enable 
them correct recurring resource imbalances and also adjust to structural changes on the terms of acquisition and 
expenditure of foreign exchange. In its original sense, SAP was a ploy used by economically advanced countries 
to hands-off responsibility on those state-owned industries that were no longer capable of competing “with the 
new industrial capacity in developing countries” (Toye, 1995:1). That had been the trend from the 1940s until 
the 1980s. It was in the 1980s that SAP acquired a new meaning, the occurrence of which, according to Toye 
(1995), remarkably changed the history of world economic development. With its new connotation, SAP since 
then came to be associated with the developing countries, including Nigeria. 
 
The SAP for the developing countries was occasioned by the desire to combat deteriorating economic conditions 
coupled with the socio-political crises of the time. By the 1980s, Nigeria was already in the midst of economic 
decline especially in the prices of crude oil, which was the country‟s main source of foreign exchange earnings. 
When  it  came  on  board  in  the  political  leadership  of  Nigeria,  President  Babangida‟s  regime  was  mainly 
concerned with redressing the external debt crisis facing the country. Thus, alongside the initial conditions, the 
Babangida regime, like those of other African countries, was motivated by the desire to improve the domestic 
economic performance by increasing domestic savings, higher export earnings, and greater domestic production, 
among others factors (Faruqee and Hussain, 1994 cited in Nwagbara, 2004).  
 
As outlined by Babangida‟s regime, SAP as introduced in Nigeria had the following key objectives: to reduce 
the preponderance of unproductive investments in the public sector; to achieve viable balance of payment; to 
reduce dependence on oil and on imports by restructuring and diversifying the productive base of the economy, 
etc. In other to achieve the said objectives, the IMF prescribed means which include adoption of appropriate 
pricing policies in all sectors with greater reliance on market forces; restructuring and rationalization of the 
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of a realistic exchange rate were pursued. The idea of reliance on market forces and liberalization was to make 
the economic environment attractive for foreign investors to come in and do business (Edward, 1993; Tybout, 
1992; Mkandawire, 1995; Havyrlyshyn, 1990). What was the outcome of SAP? 
 
With all its connotations and exigencies, SAP generated so many upheavals among the civil society in many 
adjusting countries. The World Bank sponsored studies on SAP concentrate mainly on the area of assessment of 
the  overall  policy  environment  in  countries  that  embarked  on  the  adjustment  programmes  with  a  view  to 
ascertaining the successes or failures of the reform policies. In 1994, one of such reports concluded that there 
were  some  improvement  among  29  countries  that  embarked  on  SAP  in  the  spheres  macroeconomic,  and 
agricultural policies. Other spheres such as deregulation and liberalization of markets were scored low marks 
while  the  areas  concerning  public  enterprises  and  the  financial  system,  were  said  to  be  resistant.  While 
acknowledging that such improvements were not uniform across the countries and sectors, the report pointed out 
areas that required improvement (Faruqee and Hussain,  1994 cited in Nwagbara, 2004). In those countries 
where SAP did not succeed, the World Bank blamed the failure on the „soft‟ attitude of the political leadership 
on organized interest groups who kicked against the implementation of the economic reform policies.  
 
While the impact of  the SAP policies on the economies of the adjusting countries  was emphasized in  the 
literature, the aspect of negative outcome of SAP on the people was not given priority attention. Where such 
studies exist, the literature did not lay emphasis on the impact of SAP on national industrial relations systems. 
Such negligence tend to ignore a more profound account on the role of organized labour and other interest 
groups on the success or failure of the IMF sponsored economic reform programmes. 
 
Having accepted SAP after a long period of public debate, the Babangida administration began the reform 
processes without concern about how such reforms might adversely affect some interest groups. Urban dwellers 
especially public sector employees  were  hard hit by the  austerity  measure,  which began before SAP. This 
deplorable situation was exacerbated by the introduction of SAP. Some of the reforms led to cut in the take 
home pay of workers; massive retrenchment of workers; high cost of living and removal of subsidies, among 
others. This led to the decline of the real incomes of civil servants (who are mostly urban dwellers) by almost 50 
per cent.  
 
While the wages of urban dwellers declined and remained stagnant since 1986, the real income of rural dwellers 
increased by up to 40 per cent in the same period (Faruqee & Hussain, 1994 cited in Nwagbara, 2004). This 
disparity, coupled with high inflationary rate; low purchasing capacity of the naira; job and food insecurity led 
to unprecedented protests by the aggrieved interest groups. The government on its part took the situation into its 
strides by employing repressive measures on opponents of its reform policies. It was within the context of this 
crisis situation, which characterized public sector industrial relations operated in Nigeria that this research study 
was situated. The essence of it was to delineate its specificities (if any) from other periods and proffers some 
explanations.  
 
Organized labour in Nigeria has historically protested against unfavourable government policies (Offiong, 1983, 
Nwagbara, 1999). Beginning from the colonial era up to the Babangida regime, the literature is crammed with 
account of labour protests or impact of organized labour on government policies of various regimes that had 
shaped government – labour relationship. Oftentimes, these protests manifest in the form of strike action, a more 
potent weapon employed by organized labour over the years to press home its demands. 
 
For instance, following unfavourable and discriminatory colonial regime policies against black workers in the 
public sector employment, organized labour in Nigeria was able to stage, as far back as 1945, one of the most 
important strikes that could not be easily forgotten in the nation‟s history. Part of the intriguing aspects of the 
1945 General Strike is the fact that organized labour in Nigeria was at its budding stage, being formed through 
the ingenuity and expertise of Henry Libert, a Liberian migrant labourer and some of the educated elites in the 
nationalist struggle (Offiong, 1983).  
 
The presence of military dictatorships in the nation‟s political scene and their use of repressive decrees could not 
stop organized labour from using the strike instrument whenever the need arises. At best, such legislation could 
cause a temporary setback on organized labour after which organized labour develops some immunity against 
the harsh and hostile confrontations of the military (Cohen, 1974; and Ubeku, 1986) Thus, lack of fair policies 
and perceived inequity as a result of a blockade has been beneath most of the overt factors that motivate strike 
action among organized labour in the public sector of Nigerian industrial relations system. 
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relations arena, Cohen (1974:174) and Ubeku (1986:167) chronicled the list of strike actions that occurred both 
in civilian regimes of voluntarism and the interventionist era of military rule by decrees. In both periods, trade 
unions  have  increasingly  embarked  upon  strike  action.  From  1960-68,  Cohen  (1974:174)  recorded  a  total 
number of 706 strikes involving about 254307 workers with at least 1213088 man-days lost. On the other hand, 
Ubeku (1986:167) recorded a total number of 1,078 strikes between 1968 and1976. These strikes involved about 
474,864 with about 144, 4516 man-days lost.  
 
A breakdown of the number of strikes compiled by the scholars shows that there was a steady increase in the 
number of strikes in the so-called military interventionist era. For instance, from 1968-70, there was obviously a 
steady increase in the number of strikes totalling about 199 for the period. This figure amounts to about 18.46 
per cent of the total number of strikes during the period of 1968-76 or about 28.19 per cent of the total number 
of strike for the period between 1960-68 (Nwagbara, 1999:11).  
 
A one-year period – 1970-71 alone – witnessed 124 strikes or 11.50 per cent of the total number of strikes 
between the period of 1968 and 1976. Ubeku (1986:168) observed that there was a momentary downward slope 
in the incidence of strike after which it phenomenally ascended to “an all time high of ” 723 within a three-year 
period of 1973-1976. 
 
A further analysis of the strike figures for this three-year period indicates that the year 1973-74 has 105(9.74%) 
strikes while 1974-75 and 1975-76 have 354 or 32.84 per cent and 264 or 24.49 per cent of the strikes within the 
period, respectively.  
 
 Between the years studied by these scholars, it could be noticed that the incidence of strikes was not a perfect 
upward sloping trend. There were temporary downward slopes in-between the years. Ubeku (1986) readily 
found  an  explanation.  He  noted  that  such  fluctuations  in  the  number  of  strikes  occurred  whenever  a  new 
legislation is promulgated to check the activity of organized labour. He cited the case of 1968 when the military 
government promulgated the first decree that banned strikes in the Nigerian industrial relations.  
 
Ubeku (1986) was quick to point out that although the law and physical threats by law enforcement agents 
create some restraining influence “on the propensity to strike”, it “did not act as a deterrent”. Workers easily 
organize themselves after the initial months of shock from the hostility of the law. In fact strike has become a 
household word in Nigeria. It seems to have become a normal way of life as people hardly get surprised about it 
these days. To most scholars and well-meaning Nigerians, the strike situation calls for adequate concern. 
 
 Writing on the issue of strike, Tokunbo as cited in Damachi (1984) decried the prevailing frequency of the 
strike situation. He observed that in 1982, there was a total of 340 trade disputes out of which 257(75%) resulted 
in strike. The scenario was particularly gloomy for the country as he observed. As he noted, 91 trade disputes 
were  declared  and  64(70%)of  them  resulted  in  strike.  Tokunbo  in  Damachi  (1984:2) then  summarized  his 
dismay as follows: 
In  February  of  1983,  15  trade  disputes  occurred  and  14  resulted  in  strike….This  is  not  an 
encouraging picture. The conclusion that one is led to is multidimensional –  that the collective 
bargaining process is inefficient or has broken down, that the Labour Ministry is inefficient and 
requires re-organization  to meet the pressures and demands of modern industry, and finally that 
the arbitral machinery needs a shake-up from lethargy and a reordering of its methodology to 
assure its operation as a part of and within the collective bargaining process. 
 
This fear about the efficiency of the industrial relations machinery was confirmed by Krinsky‟s (1980) assertion 
in  that  regard.  Krinsky  argued  that  the  breakdown  of  collective  bargaining  modalities  in  the  hands  of  the 
lawmakers and government officials have been responsible for industrial grievances and strikes. He believes that 
workers in the public sector are not comfortable breaking the law by embarking on strike action. But they feel 
compelled to do so in order to change what they perceive as unjust conditions such as deprivation of the right to 
organize and bargain. 
 
 From the foregoing one could easily assert that there is a high propensity for organized labour to grieve in 
Nigeria. On the basis of this assertion one can equally argue that there is a positive correlation between the 
propensity of organized labour to grieve and their propensity to strike. This view was modelled after Kassalow‟s 
(1969:156) observation on the phenomenon of strike in the US labour relations. In comparing the trends of 
strike in the US and the situation in Western Europe, he observed that the incidence of strike is higher in the US 
because of the high propensity of US workers to grieve. He arrived at his conclusion after comparing the strike 
statistics of the US and those of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, etc. He however warned Australian Journal of Business and Management Research   Vol.1 No.7 [30-41] | October-2011                                     
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that comparisons like this should be made with great amount of caution due to the fact that strike statistics for 
any country or any particular year could be subjected to some special explanation.  
 
While the researcher is conscious of this warning, she is tempted to make a brief remark on both statistics. The 
annual average of man- days lost for Nigeria between 1960 and 1968 is more than three times that of the US, 
which were 477 for a ten-year period between 1956 and 1965. Also, it is more than the sum of the US, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and Great Britain. The 
same could be said of the period 1968-76 where the figures of man-days lost in Nigeria were even greater than 
the earlier period. 
 
METHODS 
Simply put, this study is essentially a sociological analysis of industrial relations in Nigeria during Babangida‟s 
SAP and political transition era. Historical information formed the bulk of data for the study while whatever 
lapses associated with it was made up for by the additional use of sample survey. Subjects were administered 
with questionnaires for first-hand information on the problem of social unrest during the introduction of SAP. 
The  study  population  includes  academic  staff  of  universities  in  Nigeria,  students  in  the  universities,  and 
civil/public servants whose unions are under the umbrella of the NLC. A sample of lecturers and students was 
selected from the University of Calabar while the sample from the other category of workers was selected from 
workers in Federal parastatals in Calabar Metropolis, Cross River State.  
 
The study utilized many comparable research situations. Apart from collecting historical data, existing data was 
collected on different regimes and interest groups in Nigeria. Questionnaires were administered and responses 
obtained  from  groups  in  Calabar  such  as  trade  union  members  in  the  public  sector,  university  students, 
politicians and those in government. A total of 357 questionnaires were administered on respondents. These 
formed the bulk of the primary data for the study. All the data put together, the historical data available formed 
the basis of examination and explanation of the differences and similarities within Nigeria at different points in 
history.  
Many research questions were raised to aid in providing answers to the problems identified for investigation. 
The following hypotheses will guide the study: 
1.  There is no significant relationship between economic hardship occasioned by SAP conditionality and 
interest groups‟ protests against its‟ introduction. 
2.  Interest groups in Nigeria do not perceive Babangida‟s regime as the most repressive of all the military 
regimes the country had. 
 
Thus the research questions and hypotheses, together, guide the step-by-step process of data collection for this 
study.  Following  the  research  questions  and  hypotheses,  the  ensuing  model  was  constructed  to  show  the 
relationship existing among the variables under investigation. 
1.  Sap Led to Social Unrest: What factors influenced the unfavourable disposition of organized labour 
and other interest groups against SAP? Or, why did Nigerians protest against SAP? 
a.  The people encountered harsher conditions of living. 
b.  Government  retrenched  workers  and  drastically  cut  the  pay  package  of  those  still  in  its 
employ. 
c.  Subsidies were removed. 
d.  The high inflationary trend further enhanced the deterioration of the standard of living of the 
people. 
e.  The unemployment situation in the country worsened. 
f.  SAP package was not in the interest of public sector organized labour. 
g.  Feeling of relative deprivation was intense. 
h.  People were ignorant of the benefits of SAP. 
2.  A Schematic representation of the model: 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above schema is interpreted to mean that SAP generated or accentuated those social conditions (A - H), 
which in turn, gave rise to social unrest. 
 
A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H 
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3.  A Mathematical Model: 
The above schematic model can be represented mathematically thus: 
Y   x; (y  x)  can be further symbolized as y = f (x)
i) which may be interpreted as: 
Y= a + x  
Where „a‟ represents SAP, „x‟ represents the precipitating (social) factors, and „y‟ represents social unrest.      
 
In the mathematical model above, the social factors „x‟ may have been in existence and capable of causing 
social unrest „y‟; but the introduction of SAP „a‟, gave additional impetus to the degree of „y‟ ordinarily caused 
by „x‟. The key word here is degree. Thus, it is this question of „degree‟ that enabled the researcher to determine 
SAP induced protests being examined in the present study. In the above relationship, it has been shown that 
SAP may have only added to the social conditions enumerated above to give rise to social unrest. 
 
There are other possible relationships that could be established between the variables above. For instance, SAP 
may have a multiplying effect on the social conditions that generate social unrest. This relationship that has a 
higher degree of impact than the one above can be depicted thus: y= ax, in which case „y‟ may occur as a result 
of multiplying effect of „a‟ on „x‟. Other possible levels of relationship include: y = x
a, and y =a +x + ax + x
a. In 
the second example, „a‟ might have had an exponential multiplying effect on „x‟ to generate „y‟ while in the last 
example, all the above possible situations existing between SAP and social conditions (a +x, ax, and x
a) might 
have functioned together to give rise to „y‟.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The findings were presented and briefly discussed below. 
Table 1: Distribution of respondents‟ responses on the question, do you support the introduction of SAP? 
Variables  No. of Respondents  Total  Percentage 
Students  Lecturers  Others 
Yes  5  10  15  30  8.40 
No  130  77  95  302  84.59 
Not sure  5  10  10  25  7.01 
Total  140  97  120  357  100.00 
Source: Fieldwork, 2004. 
 
The responses of the respondents on the issue of support for the introduction of SAP in Nigeria as shown in 
Table 1 above is quite revealing. As shown in the table, a total number of 302 respondents representing 84.59 
per cent of the total number of respondents were not in support of the introduction of SAP. A further breakdown 
of the 302 people that did not support SAP shows that 130 (43.05%) of them were students while 77 (25.50%) 
and  95  (31.46%)  were  lecturers  and  other  categories  of  workers,  respectively.    The  130  students  that  are 
opposed to SAP represent 96.43 per cent of the total number of students in the sample; the 77 lecturers that said 
no to SAP represent 79.38 per cent of the total lecturers in the sample while the 95 other workers that reject SAP 
represent 79.17 per cent of the total respondents in that category. Only 30 (8.40%) of the total respondents said 
they support the introduction of SAP while the remaining 25 (7.01%) respondents were undecided. This finding, 
to a large extent, supports an earlier study carried out by Ogbuagu (1995) in which he found out that those who 
did not support the introduction of SAP in Nigeria were more than those who supported it. 
 
Responses to a follow-up question of „why did you not support SAP?‟ reveal that those who did not support 
SAP based their reason on a number of factors few of which will be mentioned here. One of these factors is the 
externality of the reform process against which they preferred an inward-looking approach, which should be 
locally conceived and nurtured. This, they believe, will be devoid of the adverse effects of the IMF-imposed 
SAP. During personal interactions with some of the students‟ leaders and officers of the NLC in Calabar, they 
frowned at the IMF-induced reform, which they said had a litany of unpleasant consequences on the general 
public due largely to the dependent status of our economy on those of the donor countries. As a matter of fact, 
all the academic staff in the sample mentioned the imposition of the IMF-type of economic reform on the 
country  as  their  main  grievance  for  not  supporting  SAP.  They  opined  that  there  was  need  to  revamp  the 
economy but not at the dictate of the IMF. Nigeria, according to the respondents, is already endowed with 
abundant riches which, if well managed will alleviate the present hardship facing the majority of the population. 
This brings in another factor, which is the issue of exploitation and continued impoverishment of the citizenry as 
we continue to depend on the dictates of the Western super powers. Responses to a related question of „why did 
you protest against SAP‟ showed a lot of similarities to the earlier ones. All the 357 respondents selected the 
options that SAP was a foreign imposition; it is not in the interest of the people of Nigeria, it produces more 
adverse consequences than benefits, and that it an anti-development policy programme that threw many people 
into the labour market, among other reasons. Australian Journal of Business and Management Research   Vol.1 No.7 [30-41] | October-2011                                     
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These responses are consistent with the views of most Nigerians who are acquainted with whole antecedents and 
politics of the SAP and who had the opportunity to contribute to the debate ensuing from the SAP phenomenon. 
Just as many Nigerians – scholars and non-scholars alike – are criticizing the current policy tagged the New 
Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) as a foreign imposition, so it was with SAP.  In lurid 
and comprehensive manner, one Ibrahim Ayagi, a merchant bank operator quoted in African Concord (1990:38) 
said out his mind about SAP in the following way: 
Originally SAP in theory was good. We all agreed with it. That‟s the one which we had in books. 
That is exactly what is not being implemented. The one being followed religiously… is full of 
contradictions. On one hand we say we are being self-reliant but instead of that, we want to import 
this, we want to import that. We all talk of having less foreign exchange to go round and how to 
service debt, how to raise more loans, as if these are the issues. But we know that when you are 
being self-reliant, you don‟t talk of more loans. You talk about servicing of the loans with what 
you have. You are not going to be of good behaviour so that other people could offer your more 
loans. What we see today is a completely different system. It is purely IMF‟s. 
 
In consonant with the above opinion was Obasanjo‟s earlier statement quoted in the Newswatch magazine of 
1989 and cited in Ogbuagu (1995:130) thus: 
The structural adjustment programme, as has been adopted by most African governments, is the 
brainchild  of  the  World  Bank  and  the  IMF  and  their  officials  cannot  deny  selective  and 
discriminate use of data and statistics to advance and support “the success” of the programme of 
adjustment designed by them to save Africa. 
 
These  arguments  no  doubt  have  their  substance.  It  could  be  recalled  that  while  Nigerians  rejected  the 
introduction of SAP after several debates, Babangida still went ahead and accepted it at the prompting of the 
IMF  representative  in  Nigeria.  In  another  development,  Obasanjo  was  quoted  in  the  Newswatch  (1990:7) 
saying: 
…the people recommending SAP for you do not recommend it elsewhere… there is a bit of 
racism in this thing and if we don‟t see it, then we are stupid… our currency has grossly been 
undervalued. And the ramification of that is on the low income people… Whoever feeds you can 
hold you to ransom. They can enslave you. 
 
In response to the question on whether SAP has any adverse effect on the well-being of many Nigerians, all the 
357 respondents  answered  in  the  affirmative.  Reacting  to  a  follow-up  question,  they  listed  some  problems 
ranging from retrenchment of workers, high cost of living as a result of removal of subsidies, unemployment, 
inflation, etc. as SAP induced ugly consequences confronting the citizenry in our society. The opinion of these 
respondents is supported by the views of many Nigerians about the consequences of SAP. One of such views 
came from a prominent statesman, a former warlord and leader of the defunct Biafra Republic, Chief Emeka 
Odimegwu Ojukwu. In his criticism of SAP and what it stands for, Ogbuagu (1995:132) quoted him as saying: 
I am not an economist…but one thing I can tell you is that the poor of Nigeria are dying slowly… 
The proof of the pudding, no matter what you say can be seen in the eyeball of those for whom 
you make the policy… I repeat, the poor and the disadvantaged of Nigeria are dying slowly. 
 
Following the above issue, respondents‟ responses on the question of comparison between the standard of living 
of the people before SAP and under SAP was fascinating. It was almost a unanimous response, with 347 or 
97.20 per cent respondents saying that the standard of living was worsened under SAP and better before its 
introduction  while  the  remaining  10  (2.80%)  respondents  did  not  state  whether  there  was  any  difference 
between the two periods or not. There was no response to say that the standard of living of the people was better 
under SAP.  
 
Following the above question on the direct effect of SAP on members of the society was another one on the 
effect of SAP on the economy of the country. The respondents were required to state whether  the nation‟s 
economy improved or performed well at all under SAP or not based on its influence on the general well being of 
the people. Very interesting responses emanated from the respondents.  
 
Probing  further  on  the  restiveness  during  SAP,  respondents  were  asked  whether  the  economic  hardship 
consequent to the introduction of SAP contributed to the protests. A greater number of the respondents – 93 per 
cent - agreed that SAP protests were mainly provoked by the attendant economic hardship more than any other 
factor. This hardship, which was widespread, might have been the reason why market women as well as school 
children participated in the protests. Australian Journal of Business and Management Research   Vol.1 No.7 [30-41] | October-2011                                     
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Table 2 shows respondents‟ ranking of various military regimes‟ level of authoritarianism and repression of 
organized interest groups in Nigeria. 
Regime  Rank order* 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
General Gowon        4       
General Murtala          5     
General Obasanjo            6   
General 
Buhari/Idiagbon 
  2           
President Babangida  1             
General Abacha      3         
General Abubakar              7 
Source: Fieldwork, 2004. 
*The ranking is done in the descending order with „1‟ as most, and „7‟ as least, repressive and authoritarian. 
 
On the question that required the respondents to rank military regimes in the country in terms of degree of 
repression and authoritarianism in handling industrial relations matters with organized labour and other issues of 
interest groups‟ activities, their responses are presented in Table 2 above. As could be seen from the table, 
President Babangida was ranked the most authoritarian and repressive military regime the country has ever had 
followed by the Buhari/Idiagbon regime which it overthrew by a counter coup and succeeded in 1985. 
 
Following the general economic hardship in the country as a result of the austerity measures and the massive 
corruption in the country under the civilian government of President Shehu Shagari, General Buhari responded 
to the public outcry and wrested power from Shagari in December 1983 supposedly to save the deplorable 
situation.  General  Buhari/Idiagbon  regime  began  by  dealing  ruthlessly  with  cases  of  corruption  and 
misappropriation of public funds and properties. Not being able to strike a favourable deal with the IMF for a 
loan, the regime went ahead to tackle the economic problem confronting the country by retrenching workers 
without benefit, and cutting the salaries of those who were retained and repressing opposition with military 
might. 
 
In 1985, Babangida overthrew the Buhari/Idiagbon government. Babangida claimed that he did so in the interest 
of the people; to save them from the excesses of his predecessor and foster a better economic status for the 
nation.  Not  too  long,  Babangida  found  himself  engrossed  in  the  same  ills  for  which  he  persecuted  his 
predecessor thereby reneging on his promised  mission of putting a stop to authoritarianism and stamp out 
corruption. He clamped down on opposition with reckless abandon. He not only adopted the obnoxious decrees 
of his predecessor such as the infamous Decree No. 2 of 1984, he further promulgated more stringent ones such 
as the Trade Disputes (Emergency) Decree of 1988, and devised more subtle and nefarious strategies of using 
them against opposition. The leadership ranks of the NLC as  well as the press  fell victim of Babangida‟s 
tyranny. 
 
This  finding  is  supported  by  findings  from  a  related  study  carried  by  Ogbuagu.  Ogbuagu  (1995:138-139) 
required  his  subjects  to  compare  the  system  of  governance  in  Nigeria  before  and  under  SAP  and  also  to 
specifically state whether Buhari‟s regime or that of Babangida was more repressive. In the first question, about 
57  per  cent  of  his  respondents  said  that  the  SAP  era  system  of  governance  under  Babangida  was  more 
authoritarian. For the second question 62 per cent of the respondents said that Babangida was more repressive 
while 36 per cent said that Buhari was more repressive. About 2 per cent recorded „no‟ opinion. Flowing from 
these responses, Ogbuagu (1995:139) summarized his findings as follows: 
One cannot fail to observe the consistency on the part of the respondents with regard to the authoritarian and 
repressive character of the Babangida government in the SAP period and which intensified as the Nigerian 
economic health got worse. More interesting was the picking of the Babangida‟s regime as more authoritarian 
than that of Buhari. This is because the Buhari regime was widely seen (especially during the 1983-1985 period 
and for some years after) as the most authoritarian government the country has had to contain with since its 
political independence in 1960. When the Babangida regime assumed power in 1985, it popularized itself by 
claiming that it did so to reverse authoritarianism; and to permit respect for human rights to bloom in the polity.  
Thus,  it  could  be  argued  that  although  Buhari‟s  regime  exhibited  a  lot  of  repressive  attitude  and 
authoritarianism, that displayed by his successor (Babangida) was unparalleled. 
 
Like  the  Babangida  regime,  which  it  succeeded,  Abacha‟s  government  had  an  uncompromising  attitude  to 
industrial relations issues and had no room  for opposition. Unlike its predecessor, the Abacha  government 
bordered little about collective bargaining in spite of pressure from trade unions. In fact, his (Abacha‟s) was a Australian Journal of Business and Management Research   Vol.1 No.7 [30-41] | October-2011                                     
 
39 
case of a mute tyrant who insidiously dealt with disenchanted interest groups. 
Following the Abacha regime in the order of ranking by respondents is Gowon‟s regime. It was Gowon‟s 
government that introduced a radical departure from the legacy of voluntarism and free collective bargaining to 
that of interventionism in industrial relations. This change came in response to the political upheaval of the time 
as well as concern for an atmosphere conducive and essential for implementation of government  economic 
policies. Thus, in 1968, Gowon promulgated the Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) Decree of 1968 and 
amended in 1969. In this decree, strike was banned and it became an offence for any interest group to embark 
upon  strike  action  (Okwara,  1991:63).  Although  nonconforming  trade  unions  and  union  leaders  were 
incarcerated, this did not measure up to the tune of such incidence in the Babangida and Abacha eras.  
 
The next in the rank is Gen. Murtala‟s regime followed by that of Gen. Obasanjo. Gen. Murtala who came into 
power on July 29, 1975 could not carry out his sanitizing mission of ridding the country of corruption as he was 
assassinated in a coup on February 13, 1976. Murtala was succeeded by his second in command, Gen. Olusegun 
Obasanjo. When he assumed office, Gen. Obasanjo indicated his interest in continuing with the policies of Gen. 
Mohammed. He presents his case thus as cited in 0jiako(nd: 47): 
I know that he (Mohammed) would have wished that somebody should continue the task of nation 
building from  where he left  off. I have  worked very closely  with  him and I have shared his 
benefits and commitments to the Federal Government‟s policies and actions…. All policies of 
Federal Military Government continue as before and all ministries should continue their usual 
duties. 
 
True to his promise, Obasanjo implemented the master plan of Murtala, including his labour policy in which 
compulsory check-off was introduced by legislation and trade unions was restructured on industrial lines, among 
other things. The labour policy of this regime restricted and put to limit the exercise of free collective bargaining 
and banned those organizations classified as essential services or strategic from embarking on strike action. 
 
The least in the rank, General Abdulsalami Abubakar‟s regime was a child of circumstance. It came at heels of 
the death of the acclaimed dictator Gen. Sani Abacha. Gen. Abubakar was the exact opposite of his predecessor 
and had the reputation of placing a smile on the lips of civil servants with a generous salary increase even 
though that was shortly overtaken by the galloping inflation in the country. Also, his regime had little or no 
track record of repression or authoritarianism against workers and their unions or other interest groups until the 
end of his regime in May 1999 when he willingly handed over power to the present democratically elected 
government headed by President Olusegun Obasanjo.  
 
There  was  a  question  on  the  justification  of  Babangida‟s  overly  repressive  attitude  toward  interest  group 
protests, especially those of the organized labour. Respondents were required to state whether or not President 
Babangida‟s repressive attitude toward organized labour was due to the desire to revamp the economy and 
sanitize the country‟s political system. The following responses as presented in Table 6 below were the outcome 
of the summary of their responses. 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study examined the SAP scenario during Babangida‟s regime and why interest groups in Nigeria were 
opposed to it. In reaction to mounting opposition against his regime‟s obnoxious policies, Babangida resorted to, 
and meted out generous amount of repressive treatment on dissenting voices, while co-opting into his cabinet 
some of the acclaimed social critics who were championing the cause of oppositions against his SAP regime. 
The study pointed out that SAP opposition was sustained as a result of what Nigerian workers termed excessive 
foreign influence on its adoption regardless of its adverse social consequences on the citizenry. In all, interest 
groups especially those with fixed incomes within Nigeria were worse off.  
Based on the findings, the following recommendations were made:                                                     
  Proper  sensitization  and  enlightenment  programmes  should  be  carried  out  before 
government‟s introduction of new policies such as SAP to assuage the fear of the general 
public. 
  Implementation of SAP should have a human face. Massive retrenchment of workers, removal 
of subsidies and privatization of public enterprises without a safety net to cushion their effects 
on the people will generate discontentment among the populace. 
  Government should be prudent in the management of resources at its disposal. There would 
not have been any need for SAP if the political leaders were prudent in the management of the 
abundant human and natural resources resources with which the nation is endowed.   
  Political leaders should imbibe the principle of good governance. Cases of mismanagement 
are rare when there is good governance. Political leaders of Nigeria and their bureaucratic Australian Journal of Business and Management Research   Vol.1 No.7 [30-41] | October-2011                                     
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henchmen should display the spirit of accountability and transparency in their dealings with 
public property and funds, in accordance with international best practices. 
  Trade unions/interest groups  should to re-invent themselves in other to stand a chance of 
future growth. This they could do by engaging in self-help projects that will enhance the 
living condition of their members and also help shape and reflect a collectivist view of the 
political economy. Under the prevailing circumstances of globalization, organized labour in 
the public sector should abide by the advice of Taylor (1997) suggesting that trade unions 
become “malleable and innovative or they will die”. 
  Government  and  organized  labour  should  resort  to  roundtable  negotiations  to  resolve 
conflicting  issues  and  each  party  should  endeavour  to  honour  its  part  of  a  collective 
agreement.  
  Taking into cognizance the fragile nature of the International Labour Office‟s (ILO) „Freedom 
of Association‟ as human rights instrument almost everywhere around the world, it behooves 
on organized labour to „soft ground‟ in the area of institutionalized means through which they 
channel their grievances. This does not imply subjugating the very essence of formation of 
trade unions, which is the protection of workers‟ rights and achievement of better working 
conditions and improved standard of living to the  whims and caprices of the state or the 
employer. The point being made is that a new strategy, which is built around the very essence 
which trade unions stand for, is required to deal with the deepening workplace insecurities and 
unstable labour markets.       
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i Note that the symbol „  ‟ means varies with while „f‟ denotes the varying degrees to which SAP can exacerbate 
the social conditions that give rise to social unrest. 